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ABSTRACT
This Comment explores the implications SNS postings have on private
employers concerning the off-duty, non-work related conduct of their employees.
This argument recognizes that an employee is entitled to engage in whatever legal
off-duty conduct he chooses, so long as the behavior does not damage his
employer’s legitimate business interests. An employer should not be able to use
information gleaned from an employee’s SNS postings, unrelated to an employer’s
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business interests, to punish an employee her choices outside the work place.
Disciplining or terminating an employee for his off-duty lifestyle choices permits
the morals and standards of the employer to control the employee’s personal life.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an eighteen-year-old woman out on the town for a night of revelry.
Imagine that said young woman poses for photographs with a passed-out young
man, his body festooned with drawings of swastikas and phallic symbols. Then,
the photographs are posted to a website for all of her friends to see. No big deal,
chalk it up to youthful indiscretion? The sort of activity that a person is not fired
for, right? Wrong. The New England Patriots (“Patriots”), an NFL team, fired
eighteen-year-old cheerleader, Caitlin Davis, for being in such photographs on the
1
website Facebook. In the photographs, Davis leaned over an unconscious male,
his face covered with drawings of phallic symbols, swastikas, and offensive
2
statements. The photographs bounced from Facebook, to onblastatlast.com, to
3
deadspin.com. Despite her protests that the photographs were “taken out of
4
context” and that she did not draw on the individual, the New England Patriots
5
fired Caitlin Davis.
The Internet is littered with the tales of those people fired over the content of
6
their social networking sites profiles. Social networking sites (“SNS”) and social
7
media are websites that “allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public
profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they
share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those
8
made by others within the system.” Facebook boasts over eight hundred million
9
10
active users. Approximately 50% of all active users log onto the website daily.
Every minute, YouTube users upload 48 hours of streaming video onto the
1
Catharine Smith & Craig Kanalley, Fired over Facebook: 13 Posts That Got People CANNED,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2010, 11:40 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/26/fired-overfacebook posts_n_659170. html#s17699&title=NFL_Cheerleader_Fired.
Facebook is a social networking website. For a definition of “social networking websites”, see infra
text accompanying note 7.
2
Id.
3
Sarah F. Sullivan, New England Patriots Cheerleader Caitlin Davis Fired over Facebook
Pictures, YAHOO! VOICES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://voices.yahoo.com/new-england-patriots-cheerleadercaitlin-davis-fired-2161126.html.
4
Id.
5
Smith & Kanalley, supra note 1.
6
See id. Those fired for their Facebook postings are said to be “Facebook fired.” Keith R. Crosley,
Dooced, Twerminated, Facebook Fired: Lingo and Facts about Social Media and Employee
Terminations, PROOFPOINT (Sep. 2, 2009), http://blog.proofpoint.com/2009/09/dooced-twerminatedfacebook-fired-lingo-and-facts-about-social-media-and-employee-terminations.html.
7
For purposes of this article, “social networking sites” will refer to both social networking and
social media websites.
8
Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional Boundaries, 31
PACE L. REV. 228, 237 (2011) (quoting Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites:
Definition, History, and Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (Oct. 2007), http://jcmc.indiana.
edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html).
9
Facebook, Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Nov.
8, 2011).
10
Id.
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12

website. Twitter, the micro-blogging website, has 100 million users.
To participate in an SNS, a user creates a profile and interacts with other
users by posting messages to profiles, posting photographs and videos, and
13
creating status updates.
A post’s content takes many forms, like musings on
traffic or a link to a particular website. Just as the Supreme Court predicted in City
of Ontario v. Quon, SNSs are now a “necessary instrument[] for self-expression,
14
[and] self-identification.”
While a user’s postings are published to a profile, access to a profile is not
carte blanche; each SNS offers privacy settings wherein a user can limit her
profile’s accessibility. For example, a Twitter user can “protect [her] tweets” so
they are only seen by a user’s followers and her tweets are not available to the
15
public.
Similarly, Facebook allows a user to set a default privacy level of
16
“public,” “friends,” or “custom.”
Facebook even permits a user further
customization by allowing her to choose, for example, who can post on her wall, or
17
who can view her photographs. The existence of privacy settings exemplifies the
inherent tension between the “human desire to share information with others” and
18
the desire to “maintain[] one’s privacy.”
SNSs are causing formerly disparate
19
social contexts, like employment and off-duty conduct, to collapse into one.
20
With SNS use a dominant aspect of everyday life, “[i]nformation sharing on the
21
web has reshaped our expectations of privacy,” particularly within the sphere of
22
employment law.

11
YouTube, Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
This statistic is from 2010. Id. Over 800 million “unique users” visit YouTube monthly. Id.
12
One Hundred Million Voice, TWITTER BLOG (Sep. 8, 2011), http://blog.twitter.com/2011/09/onehundred-million-voices.html.
13
See Company Overview, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited
Feb. 23, 2012).
14
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
15
Account, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/settings/account (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
16
Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK, http://facebook.com/settings/?tab=privacy (last visited Jan. 6,
2012).
17
Id. However, these privacy settings frequently change without notice, so a user should be
vigilant in checking his privacy settings to ensure it reflects his wishes.
18
DOUGLAS DEXTER, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES IN THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: NEW ISSUES FOR
EMPLOYERS 2 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
labor_law/meetings/2011/annualmeeting/028.authcheckdam.pdf.
19
Danah Boyd, Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence,
14(1) CONVERGENCE: THE INT’L J. RES. INTO NEW MEDIA TECHS. 13, 18 (2008), available at
http://www.danah.org/papers/FacebookPrivacyTrainwreck.pdf.
20
See Statistics, supra note 9.
21
DEXTER, supra note 18, at 28.
22
Jean M. Roche, Note, Why Can’t We Be Friends?: Why California Needs a Lifestyle
Discrimination Statute to Protect Employees From Employment Actions Based on Their Off-Duty
Behavior, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 187, 187 (2011).
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Presently, employers use information gleaned from online searches in their
23
hiring decisions.
An employer can monitor his employees at-work Internet
24
usage, so long as the practice is publicized and known to employees. Namely, an
employer is entitled to read an employee’s emails and check an employee’s
25
Internet activity.
There are concerns about the type of information an employee can reveal in
her SNS postings, intentionally or unintentionally—“risks that employees may
reveal trade secrets, harass their co-workers, criticize their supervisors, or simply
discuss politically—or, morally—charged topics in a manner that may be linked
26
with the company.”
Because an employer has a financial interest in his
business’s reputation, an employer is entitled to protect his business’s reputation as
27
a legitimate business interest.
Furthermore, as “personal reputation is
28
increasingly influenced by what others know about us online,”
it is
understandable that an employer may want to monitor his employees’ SNS
profiles. An employer can enact a SNS policy to mitigate or eliminate the risks
29
associated with an employee’s SNS profile. Therefore, since an employer has a
23
Id. at 189. However, online searches should be restricted to job-related information. William C.
Martucci et al., Hiring and Firing in the Facebook Age (With Sample Provisions), PRAC. LAW., Oct.
2010, at 19, 21. Accordingly, “[s]hould an employer use information found via an online search to
disqualify an applicant, an employer must be able to articulate a job-related rationale for the
disqualification. If the information is not related to the job at stake, or the employer can articulate no
such rationale,” the employer is “vulnerable” to a discrimination claim. Id.
24
Id. For example, an employee has no expectation of privacy in emails sent over the employer’s
email system when the employer maintains a practice of monitoring computer usage, the employer has
informed an employee that she has no reasonable expectation of privacy in company emails, and the
employee clicked a privacy warning in order to access the employer’s computer system. Roche, supra
note 22, at 189 n. 15. In some states, an employer is required to give notice to his employees prior to
monitoring his employee’s email communications and Internet activity. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31–
48d(b)(1) (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b)(1)–(2) (2002).
25
Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights in Social
Networking Web Site Postings: Are Facebook Firings Legal?, 23 NO. 11 EMP L. UPDATE 1, 1 (Nov.
2009) [hereinafter Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights]; see also Fact Sheet 7:
Workplace Privacy and Employee Monitoring, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (last updated Jan.
2012), http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs7-work.htm (“If an electronic mail (e-mail) system is used at a
company, the employer owns it and is allowed to review its contents.”).
26
Martucci, supra note 23, at 20.
27
Roche, supra note 22, at 189. For a definition of “legitimate business interests”, please see
discussion infra Part IV.B.
28
Id. (quoting Harry A. Valetk, Off the Clock: Should Your Personal Online Chronicles Jeopardize
Your Career?, LAW.COM (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=120213623
1178.).
29
Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, Social Media Policies: Should Your Company
Adopt One? Consider the Issues; View the Sample Policy to Decide, 24 No. 11 EMP. L. UPDATE 1, 9
(Nov. 2010) [hereinafter Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Social Media Policies]. See id. and Martucci, supra
note 23, at 25–26. This Comment will not analyze said policies.
In City of Ontario v. Quon, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “employer policies
concerning communications” are what “shape the reasonable expectations of their employees,
especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.” 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
The case asked whether a city employee, Quon, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
messages on his government-issued pager. Id. at 2622. While the Court held that Quon did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, the Court refused to decide whether an
employee always had a reasonable expectation of privacy in employer-provided technology. Id. at
2630.
However, the Supreme Court’s aversion to decide cases involving emerging technologies is eroding,
as evidenced by the Court’s landmark decision in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The
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legitimate business interest in her company’s reputation, it is unreasonable to
completely forbid an employer from perusing her employees’ SNS profiles.
However, much online behavior “does not directly affect the business
interests of the employer, and thus, should not be used against the employee” in an
30
The topic of SNS posts can be of a more
employer’s employment decisions.
controversial nature—comments, photographs, or posts can reveal that an
employee participates in risky behavior, like skydiving, or that she is involved in a
homosexual relationship. Although the above examples do not overtly implicate
an employer’s business interests, an employer can legally terminate an employee
31
for such behavior.
Generally, the employment at-will doctrine allows an
32
employer to “take action against [an employee]” for her SNS profile’s content.
Consequently, an employer can base an adverse employment decision on the fact
33
that he disagrees with an employee’s lifestyle choices.
Although an employee waives some of her privacy rights to an employer
34
upon accepting employment, courts or legislatures should recognize the
difference between an employee waiving some of her privacy rights in the
workplace versus having an employer’s influence an employee’s off-duty, nonwork related decision out of fear of an adverse employment decision.
The above examples show that employers are disciplining employees for off35
duty conduct as in SNS postings. Further complicating the matter is the fact that
36
employees consider their SNS profiles private. Employer and employee attitudes
towards social networking are not merely divergent, but completely antagonistic.
According to a 2009 study by Deloitte, LLP, 53% of employees believe their SNS

Court held that the government violated Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights when it attached a global
positioning service (“GPS”) device to his vehicle to track its movements. According to the Court,
“[t]he [g]overnment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information”
when attaching a GPS device to Jones’s car parked in his driveway. Id. at 949. The Court did not
decide if Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy, because the Fourth Amendment rights in
question did not “rise or fall with the Katz formulation.” Id. at 947; see supra text accompanying note
40. The Jones decision suggests that the Court is willing to apply Constitutional principles to emerging
technologies, which is in marked contrast to how the Court shied away from doing just that in Quon.
Compare id. at 945, with Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630. By deciding that a technological device can invade
a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court validates the present reality that technology is
an omnipresent part of everyday life. Furthermore, there is reason to hope that the Supreme Court’s
Jones decision will influence lower courts to adopt a more liberal view of technology and its place in
everyday life.
30
Roche, supra note 22, at 190 (emphasis added).
31
See infra text accompanying note 32.
32
The at-will employment doctrine allows an employer to fire an employee for any reason.
Martucci, supra note 23, at 22. Forty-nine states presume employment is at-will. Joseph Lipps, State
Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: Autonomy for Private Employees in the Internet Age, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 645, 649 (2010). Montana is the only state that does not presume at-will employment. Id.
33
See supra text accompanying note 32.
34
See supra text accompanying note 24.
35
Martucci, supra note 23, at 22.
36
DELOITTE LLP 2009 ETHICS AND WORKPLACE SURVEY AND RESULTS, SOCIAL NETWORKING
AND REPUTATIONAL RISK IN THE WORKPLACE 6 (2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/
assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_2009_ethics_workplace_survey_220509.pdf.
Opinion Research Corporation conducted a telephone survey for Deloitte LLP. Id. at 15. They
surveyed a national probability sample of 2,008 employed adults aged eighteen and older living in
private households. Id. Opinion Research Corporation also surveyed 500 business executives via an
online survey. Id.
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are “none of their employer’s business.” However, 40% of executives disagree.
30% of executives admitted to informally monitoring their employee’s SNS profile
39
postings.
The chasm between employer and employee perception of SNS
profiles is wide, and without some sort of resolution—either judicially or
legislatively—litigation is inevitable. Both legislatures and courts are resistant to
change the employment laws to recognize that an employee’s participation with
SNS warrants protection from adverse employment decisions. Instead of forcing
an employee to risk her livelihood when she participates in a socially acceptable
form of interaction, the law should accept the reasonableness of such interaction by
protecting it. SNS are part of the social culture, and the law should recognize this
40
reality.
This Comment explores the implications SNS postings have on private
employers concerning the off-duty, non-work related conduct of their employees.
This argument recognizes that an employee is entitled to engage in whatever legal
off-duty conduct he chooses, so long as the behavior does not damage his
employer’s legitimate business interests. An employer should not be able to use
information gleaned from an employee’s SNS postings, unrelated to an employer’s
business interests, to punish an employee her choices outside the work place.
Disciplining or terminating an employee for his off-duty lifestyle choices permits
the morals and standards of the employer to control the employee’s personal life.
Part I introduced the general landscape of SNS policies and employment
environment. Part II provides a background of the various causes of action
available to an employee to protest an employer’s employment decision, as well as
examining the applicability of such claims to the regulation of an employee’s offduty conduct. Section A discusses the United States Constitution’s protection for
free speech and against unlawful searches and seizures. Section B examines how
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has applied the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) to cases wherein an employee was terminated for her
SNS postings. Section C addresses the parameters of state off-duty conduct
statutes. Section D gives an overview of the common law right to privacy. Part III
analyzes the recent cases and holdings that involve SNS. Part IV further analyzes
how these holdings apply in Caitlin Davis’s situation to illustrate the consequences
of limitless employer discretion. Section B offers a definition for legitimate
business interests to be applied to SNS employment cases to determine if an
employee’s post-employment affairs affect her employer’s legitimate business
interests. Part V asserts why it is imperative that governments or legal bodies—at
37

Id. at 6.
Id.
39
Id. Even if employers are monitoring SNS pages, 61% of employees stated they would not
change their online activities, and that they would adjust their SNS profile content. Id. Even more
telling is that 27% of employees surveyed stated that they “don’t consider the ethical consequences of
posting comments, photos, or videos online—and more than one-third don’t consider their boss, their
colleagues, or their clients.” Id. at 8. This survey suggests that employees consider their SNS postings
to be their own personal space, divorced from their jobs, its responsibilities, and their SNS profile’s
impact on their employer’s business interests. In light of such attitudes, it is clear that an employer is
entitled to monitor an employee’s SNS profile for things like trade secrets reveals and the like. See
Martucci, supra note 23, at 20.
40
Emily H. Fulmer, Privacy Expectations and Protections for Teachers in the Internet Age, 2010
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, ¶ 62 (2010).
38
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either the state or federal level—draw the line between an employer’s legitimate
business interests and an employee’s freedom to structure her free time.
II. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
An employee can use some causes of actions to combat her employer’s
unjust employment action. Between the United States Constitution, the NLRA,
state statutes, and privacy causes of action, a plethora of options are available to an
employee. Unfortunately, judicial action severely limits these causes of action for
a private employee.
A. United States Constitution
Forty-two U.S.C. section 1983 confers a cause of action to a person whose
41
constitutional rights are violated by the government or its actors. Governmental
and public employees can avail themselves to the federal constitutional rights of
42
43
free speech and privacy, guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments,
44
respectively.
An employee is not protected by the Constitution against an
45
employers adverse employment decisions.
1. First Amendment
At first blush, the First Amendment appears to be an ideal cause of action for
46
a government employee to levy against her employer.
However, the Supreme
Court has limited the First Amendment’s application, qualifying which types of
47
speech garner protection. For a successful First Amendment claim, an employee

41

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
The First Amendment protects a person’s freedom of speech. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
“Speech” means the “constitutionally protected interest in [the] freedom of expression.” See Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)).
43
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual from the invasion of the government’s
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 516 (4th ed. 2011) (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)). Not
every act is “private” for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”). Courts apply Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s reasonableness standard to determine if a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy: first,
the individual must have manifested “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and, secondly,
society is “prepared to recognize” this expectation as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 742–43 (1979) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers one dials, nor does society recognize such a privacy
expectation).
44
Both state and federal governments are bound by the Constitution. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 43, at 518 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1961)) (“[T]he prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment . . . are all to be enforced against the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against
federal encroachment.”).
45
See § 1983.
46
Kelly Schoening & Kelli Kleisinger, Off–Duty Privacy: How Far Can Employers Go?, 37 N.
KY. L. REV. 287, 305 (2010).
47
See Lipps, supra note 32, at 648–49.
42
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48

must speak out “on a matter of ‘public concern.’”
Thus, a police department
does not violate the First Amendment when it terminates a police officer for
49
operating and starring in a pornographic website. Although public employees are
free to run pornographic websites for a profit, they are not free to participate and
50
“avoid [government] discipline at the same time.”
A public employee “has
51
greater protection if [she] discusses a matter of public concern.” If courts can
limit the seemingly broad protection of the Constitution, then it is of no surprise
that courts give private employers broad discretion to make employment decisions.
2. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects a public employee from her employer’s
52
unreasonable searches and seizures.
First, a court determines if the employee
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and secondly, the court determines
53
whether the search was reasonable in its scope.
The court balances the
employee’s invasion of privacy against the government’s need for control in the
54
workplace. Within the context of SNS, a government employer can implement
an electronic communication policy to destroy an employee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy so as to insulate themselves against Fourth Amendment
55
claims.

48
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)). The First Amendment’s “primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of
public concern.” Id. at 154. “Public concern” is a matter “concerning government policies that are of
interest to the pubic at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to comment.”
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 138).
If an employee is “speak[ing] or writ[ing] on their own time on topics unrelated to their
employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some governmental justification
‘far stronger than mere speculation’ in regulating it.” Roe, 543 U.S. at 80 (quoting U.S. v. Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)).
When an employee claims that her governmental employer violated her First Amendment right, a
court engages in two separate inquiries to determine if the employee’s conduct was related or unrelated
to her public employment. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2007). If the
employer’s speech was related, the court balances the employee’s interests “as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. at 927 (quoting Roe, 543 U.S.
at 82). If the employee’s speech was unrelated, the court still uses a balancing test. Id. Although the
Supreme Court has not dictated a clear balancing test, the Ninth Circuit balanced “the asserted First
Amendment right against the government’s justification.” Id.
49
Dible, 515 F.3d at 922–23. The police department terminated Dible for violating the
department’s rules forbidding outside employment and disreputable conduct. Id. at 926.
The Dibles also argued that the city violated their First Amendment rights to privacy and freedom of
association. Id. at 929. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the First Amendment includes a right to
privacy in the “right to make personal decisions and a right to keep personal matters private.” Id.
(citing Germ v. U.S. Trustee (In Re Crawford), 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999)). However, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the Dibles’s claim as “virtually oxymoron[ic].” Id. at 930. Without evidence that the
City publicized the Dibles’s connection to the Dibles’s pornographic website, the City did not invade
the Dibles’s right to privacy. Id.
50
Id. at 930.
51
Schoening & Kleisinger, supra note 46, at 306.
52
Id. at 307.
53
Id.
54
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719–20 (1987).
55
Schoening & Kleisinger, supra note 46, at 309.
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56

Because
These protections do not extend to private employees.
57
employment is at-will in forty-nine states, private employees are less protected
against an employer’s arbitrary employment decisions than a public employee.
Thus, an employee may resort to a statutory scheme for their cause of action.
B. NLRB and NLRA
Recently, the NLRB grappled with the difficult question of how much to
58
59
protect an employee’s SNS postings criticized her employer.
The NLRA
applies to both public and private employees, regardless of whether they are
60
unionized.
Specifically, the Act protects an employee’s rights to unionize,
61
collectively bargain, and participate in concerted activity.
When an employer
terminates an employee for work-related SNS posts, the employer’s activity may
be activity in violation of the NLRA.
Cases fall under two categories: first, cases that challenge an employer’s
62
SNS policies as overbroad, and secondly, cases that challenge an employer’s
63
adverse employment decision based upon an employee’s SNS posts. The NLRB
applies a two-part test to determine if an employee’s SNS post is protected under

56

Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights, supra note 25, at 2.
Public employees have had little success in claiming that they have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their SNS posts. In particular, the SNS profiles of public school teachers have led to firings,
and as a consequence, litigation. See generally Fulmer, supra note 40 (advocating that the law
guarantee teachers “special protection” against “professional discipline” for legal, private conduct in
their SNS posts). However, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012), the Court did not shy away from deciding how the Constitution’s rights apply to an emerging
technology; see supra text accompanying note 29.
57
See supra text accompanying note 24.
58
See generally OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., OM 11–74, REPORT OF
THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL] (discussing recent case developments within context of SNS). Since
many of cases are in the early stages of litigation, surveys of the cases and issues are to “assist
employers and counsel [to] identify issues with which they should [employers and counsel] be aware
[of] as they grapple with the application of labor law to employee use of social media.” MICHAEL J.
EASTMAN, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE THE NLRB, 1 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce
2011), [hereinafter SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES], available at http://www.uschamber.com/
sites/default/files/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media%20Survey%20-%20FINAL.pdf. For a complete
summary of the cases, issues, and applicable statutes involved, see generally SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA
ISSUES, at 9–34.
59
See National Labor Relations Act §§ 1–1129 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
60
Schoening & Kleisinger, supra note 46, at 312.
61
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). These rights are called “Section 7
activities” or “Section 7 rights”. See REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 58, at 12.
Concerted activity is when an employee acts “with or on the authority of other employees, and not
solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.” Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, at 497
(1984), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. N.L.R.B., 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 948 (1985).
Since concerted activity communications are protected, an employer with a social networking policy
cannot “chill” employees from exercising their Section 7 rights. See Layfette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B.
824, 825 (1998).
62
Overbroad policies are the type that restricts discussions about wages, constructive discharges,
terminations of co-workers, and general criticisms of the employer and its management. SURVEY OF
SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES, supra note 58. An employer needs to be careful that her policy does not chill
concerted activity. See supra text accompanying note 61.
63
SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES, supra note 58, at 4.
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64

the NLRA. First, the employee’s SNS post must be “related to an ongoing labor
65
dispute.” Second, the SNS post cannot “be so disloyal, reckless or maliciously
66
untrue as to lose [the NLRA’s] protection.”
However, even if an employer’s
SNS post is concerted activity, it is not protected if the employee’s SNS post
“constitutes ‘insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty’ which . . . is adequate
67
cause for discharge.”
Thus, it follows that an employer does not violate the
NLRA for terminating an employee should he reveal the employer’s trade secrets
or confidential client information.
The NLRB has applied these holdings to cases where an employer terminates
68
an employee for SNS postings relating to the employer. Generally, the NLRB
69
broadly construes what constitutes protected activity.
In doing so, the NLRB
displays a flexibility to adapt the law to the realities of the twenty-first century
workplace. The NLRB’s activity and holdings stand in stark contrast to the
activities of state and federal judiciaries, as explored in Parts II.B and III.A-C.
However, the NLRB’s holdings only apply to work-related correspondences,
thus, reveal little about whether the NLRA protects posts about off-duty conduct.
C. Off-Duty Conduct Statutes
Presently, twenty-nine states have statutes offering some protection for an
70
employee’s off-duty conduct.
Such statutes protect an employee’s many
activities, such as smoking, drinking, moonlighting and other off-duty lawful
71
conduct. Through these statutes, state legislatures have chipped away at the at72
73
will employment doctrine. Only four states protect general off-duty conduct.

State statutes vary in scope of their protection, and because of their broad
74
language courts have been responsible for statutory interpretation. Consequently,
75
statutory interpretation differs greatly. Generally, the “statutes are still undefined
76
and require modification to better fit the growing Internet lifestyle.”
64

See infra notes 65–66.
Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
66
Id. (quoting Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1240 (2000)).
67
Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers 346 U.S. 464, 477–
78 (1953)).
68
For example, one case involved an employee’s posted photographs and comments criticizing a
sales event organized by the employer. See REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note
58, at 6–9.
69
See supra text accompany note 68.
70
Roche, supra note 22, at 198.
71
Id.
72
Lipps, supra note 32, at 652, 655. Employers attempted to restrict an employee from lawfully
imbibing certain substances, or her participation in lawful conduct, out of “employer’s concerns about
rising health care costs.” Roche, supra note 22, at 198.
73
Lipps, supra note 32, at 652, 655.
74
Id. at 653.
75
Id. at 653, 676 (“[S]uch divergent views on enforcement, remedies, and exception clauses . . .
preclude consistent statutory interpretation.”).
76
Id. at 655.
65
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1. California
77

78

At first glance, sections 96(k) and 98.6 of the California Labor Code
79
seem to limit at-will employment. Section 96(k) allows the Labor Commissioner
to file an employee’s “[c]laim [] for los[t] wages as the result of demotion,
suspension, or discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during
80
nonworking hours away from the employer’s premises.” Section 98.6 states that
“[n]o person shall discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against
any employee . . . because the employee . . . engaged in any conduct delineated in
81
this chapter, including the conduct described in subdivision (k) of Section 96.”
When read together, it seems that the two sections forbid an employer from
disciplining an employee for off-duty conduct. However, California’s appellate
courts limit such an application.
In Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., defendant Household
Automotive Finance Corp. terminated plaintiff Barbee for dating a subordinate
82
employee in violation of the employer’s policy.
Barbee sued his former
employer claiming that the employer infringed upon his constitutional right to
83
84
privacy, and that his termination violated the public policy of section 96(k).
The court stated that section 96(k) did not confer “any substantive rights” upon an
85
employee, but only “authorize[d] such claims to the Labor Commissioner to
86
vindicate existing public policies in favor of individual employees.”
Thus,
section 96(k) only applies when an employee’s discipline or termination violated
87
existing rights. The court further limited their holding in Barbee by finding that
a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy must be based upon a
88
right “protected by the Labor Code” specifically. Therefore, sections 96(k) and
98.6 do not prevent an employer from disciplining or firing an employee for her
89
off-duty SNS postings.
The court’s restrictive interpretation of sections 96(k) and 98.6 strips them of
90
any “substantive protection.” Thus, the courts have prevented these laws from
being applied to new circumstances. If Caitlin Davis lived in California, she could

77

CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
§ 98.6 (Westlaw).
79
Scott A. Freedman & Jessica A. Barajas, Monitoring and Regulating Employee Conduct in the
Age of Social Media Web Sites, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 31, 2011, at 5, available at http://www.mpplaw.com
/files/Publication/539d9780-2be5-49f2-aa3a-1ab41758b98c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
80e72941-2b0d-4533-ba32-298643269a58/MonitoringAndRegulatingEmployeeConduct.pdf.
80
§ 96(k) (Westlaw).
81
§ 98.6(a) (Westlaw).
82
6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 409 (Ct. App. 2003).
83
Barbee’s privacy claim failed because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy due to
the company’s policy that forbid a manager from dating a subordinate. Id. at 411–12.
84
Id. at 408.
85
Id. at 413.
86
Id. at 414.
87
See id. at 412.
88
Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 904 (Ct. App. 2003).
89
See id.
90
Lipps, supra note 32, at 662.
78
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not sue the Patriots under these statutes because they do not confer any new
91
substantive rights. Since California is an at-will employment state, and sections
96(k) and 98.6 do not create new causes of action, Caitlin Davis cannot protest her
92
termination.
2. Colorado
Colorado’s statute forbids an employer from disciplining or terminating an
employee for any “lawful activity off the premises of the employer during
93
nonworking hours . . . .”
An employer can restrict an employee’s off-duty
conduct if the employee’s conduct “[r]elates to a bona fide occupational
requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities
94
and responsibilities,” or such conduct creates a conflict of interest “to the
95
employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest.” The statute protects
an employee “who engage[s] in activities that are personally distasteful to their
96
employer,” but are nonetheless “legal and unrelated to an employee’s job duties.”
97
In Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the court articulated the statute’s scope.
In Marsh, Delta Air Lines terminated Marsh for a letter he wrote to the Denver
98
Post that criticized Delta’s hiring policies. The court held that the statute was not
99
an “absolute” “shield” for any off-duty conduct. Thus, if an employee is arguing
her privacy was violated, her rights are balanced against her employer’s business
100
needs.
The court adopted Delta Air Line’s argument that a duty of loyalty was
101
an inherent “occupational requirement” within § 24–34–402.5(1)(a)’s exception.
Therefore, Marsh’s letter criticizing Delta Air Lines breached his duty of loyalty
102
and his subsequent termination was legal.
In Marsh, the court’s willingness to create exceptions to the statute is
disturbing and undermines the legislature’s broad language. With such an
ambiguous phrase as “duty of loyalty,” an employer can argue that nearly
anything violates such a duty. For example, when applied to the above
hypothetical, the Patriots can argue Caitlin Davis’s debauched photographs
breached her duty of loyalty to the Patriots because her actions reflected poorly

91

See supra text accompanying note 32.
See supra Part I.
93
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24–34–402.5(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the First Reg.
Sess. of the 68th Gen. Assemb. (2011)).
94
§ 24–34–402.5(1)(a) (Westlaw).
95
§ 24–34–402.5(1)(b) (Westlaw).
96
Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (D. Colo. 1997). In the same decision,
the deciding court stated the statute’s application: “[T]his statute should protect the job security of
homosexuals who would otherwise be fired by an employer who discriminates against gay people,
members of Ross Perot’s new political party who are employed by a fervent democrat, or even smokers
who are employed by an employer with strong anti-tobacco feelings.” Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1460 (“Plaintiff wrote a letter to the editor of the Denver Post that strongly criticized
Delta’s decision to employ hourly contract workers to replace laid–off full–time employees.”).
99
Id. at 1463.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1462–63.
102
Id. at 1463.
92

2012 EMPLOYEES’ EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN SOCIAL NETWORKING

115

upon her employer, just as Marsh’s letter reflected poorly on Delta Air Lines. By
restricting the statute’s application, the deciding court eliminated the statute’s
effectiveness to protect off-duty conduct.
Fortunately, later decisions limited the Marsh holding. In Watson v. Public
Service Co. of Colorado, the court held that § 24–34–402.5(1) applied to any and
103
In
all lawful, off-duty conduct, regardless of whether it was work-related.
Watson, the employer terminated an employee because the employee called the
104
Occupational Safety and Health Administration off-duty.
The employer argued
105
§ 24–34–402.5(1) did not apply because the telephone call was work-related.
They further argued § 24–34–402.5(1) only applied to private, non-work related
106
activities.
The court rejected the employer’s argument; the court interpreted the
107
statute’s language broadly, stating that “‘[a]ny’ means ‘all.’”
The court limited
the Marsh court’s decision influence by nothing that the Marsh court’s rationale
108
relied on a decision that did not involve a claim under § 24–34–402.5(1).
Furthermore, no Colorado appellate court had adopted the Marsh court’s
109
analysis.
If Caitlin Davis lived in Colorado, she could sue the Patriots for terminating
her for her SNS photographs. Although it was unsavory to pose for photographs in
front of a passed-out young-man for one’s own amusement, it most certainly is not
illegal. Furthermore, Caitlin Davis’s photographs did not fall within the statute’s
110
exceptions.
Colorado’s broad statute offers a twenty-first century employee the
ability to participate in SNS without the fear of an employer’s retribution.
111
Furthermore, it still protects the employer’s business interests.
3. New York
New York’s off-duty statute protects an employee’s “legal recreational
activities outside work hours, off the employer’s premises and without the use of
the employer’s equipment or other property” and so long as it does not “create a
112
material conflict of interest” to the employer’s business interests.
Recreational
activity is “any lawful, leisure-time activity . . . which is generally engaged in for
113
recreational purposes.”
It was this distinction—of an activity’s purpose—that
influenced the court in New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. to hold that dating was
114
not a recreational activity and was not a protected activity within § 201-d.
By

103

207 P.3d 860, 864–65 (Colo. App. 2008).
Id. at 863.
105
Id. at 864.
106
Id.
107
Id. (quoting Kauntz v. HCA-Healthstone, L.L.C., 174 P.3d 813, 817 (Colo. App. 2007)).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 865.
110
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24–34–402.5(1)(a) & (b) (West, Westlaw through the end of the
First Reg. Sess. of the 68th Gen. Assemb. (2011)).
111
See the exceptions in § 24–34–402.5(1)(1) & (b) (Westlaw).
112
N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 201-d(2)(c), d(3)(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2011, chapters 1 to 55,
57 to 521, 523 to 594, and 597 to 600 (2011)).
113
§ 201-d(1)(b) (emphasis added).
114
621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (App. Div. 1995) (two employees terminated for dating each other in
104

116
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the court’s logic, dating was wholly distinguishable from recreational activities
because dating’s “indispensible element . . . [of] romance” was absent from
115
recreational activities.
The court reasoned that by listing specific activities in §
116
201-d(1)(b)
reflected the legislature’s “obvious intent” to restrict “statutory
117
protection to [a] certain clearly defined categories of leisure-time activities.”
Through the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, personal relationships were deemed to be
“outside the scope” of recreational activities the legislature envisioned to be
118
protected under § 201-d.
Although the Southern District of New York refused to follow Wal-Mart in
119
Critics
Pasch v. Katz Media Corp., dating is still not a protected under § 201-d.
railed applying such a narrow interpretation of § 201-d, but no court has adopted
120
the rationale expressed in dissenting opinions.
The court’s restrictive
interpretation of § 201-d(1)(b)’s “recreational activities” was further entrenched by
121
the Second Circuit’s decision in McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp.
Concluding that in the absence of evidence suggesting the New York Court of
Appeals would hold differently, the Second Circuit was bound by the Wal-Mart

violation of company policy), aff’d, McCavitt v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2001)
(per curiam).
115
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The court attempted to clarify the distinction
between dating leisure-time activities through the following example: “[A]lthough a dating couple may
go bowling and under the circumstances call that activity a “date”, when two individuals lacking
amorous interest in one another go bowling or engage in any other kind of “legal recreational activity”,
they are not ‘dating.’” Id.
116
The non-exhaustive list of protected activities include “sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading
and the viewing of television, movies and similar material.” § 201-d(1)(b).
117
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
118
Id.
119
94 Civ. 8554, 1995 WL 469710, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995) (employee alleged she was
demoted for dating a former co-employee). Rejecting Wal-Mart’s rationale, the court held that the
legislature intended § 201-d to include all social activities. Id. at *5. The court stated that the
legislative history showed that the “purpose of the statute is to prohibit employers from discriminating
against their employees simply because the employer does not like the activities an employee engages
in after work.” Id.
120
The Pasch court’s opinion adopted Justice Paul J. Yesawich, Jr.’s dissent in Wal-Mart. See id.
Justice Yesawich interpreted § 201-d(1)(b)’s expansive categories of “hobbies” and “sports” as
signifying the legislature’s intent to broadly define recreational activities to include social relationships.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Yesawich, J., dissenting). Justice Yesawich also pointed
out that inherent in the statute was the intent to protect “a certain degree” of an employee’s freedom to
choose her own life during off-duty hours. Id. To interpret the statute otherwise hampered § 201d(1)(b) “remedial purpose.” Id.
And despite conceding that the Second Circuit was bound by Wal-Mart’s precedent in McCavitt,
Judge Joseph M. McLaughlin explained the holding’s absurdity:
If, when deciding to protect “recreational activities,” the Legislature saw fit
to protect an employee’s right to engage in such historically revered activities as
riding a motorcycle and hang–gliding, it certainly should have extended
protection to the pursuit of a romantic relationship with whomever an employee
chooses–even a fellow, unmarried employee outside the office, during non–
working hours.
It is repugnant to our most basic ideals in a free society that an employer can
destroy an individual’s livelihood on the basis of whom he is courting, without
first having to establish that the employee’s relationship is adversely affecting the
employer’s business interests.
McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 169 (McLaughlin, J., concurring).
121
Id. at 166.
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122

decision.
Despite the seemingly broad grant of protection guaranteed in § 201-d,
subsequent court interpretations have rendered the expansive language
meaningless. Section 201-d offers little protection because “recreational activity”
123
is narrowly construed.
If Caitlin Davis lived in New York, the Patriots
termination would not violate § 201-d. If an employer can terminate an employee
124
for her choice of intimate relationships,
it is difficult to surmise that a court
would hold debauched photographs posted to an SNS to be within § 201-d’s
protection.
4. North Dakota
On its face, North Dakota’s statute offers broad protection for an employee’s
lawful off-duty conduct, so long as said conduct is “not in direct conflict” with the
125
employer’s “business-related interests,” or “contrary to a bona fide occupational
qualification that reasonably and rationally relates to the employment activities and
126
the responsibilities of a particular employee.”
However, the courts have held
that certain exceptions are inherent to the statute, and thus, certain off-duty conduct
does not warrant the statute’s protection. For example, the court has held that
127
certain employees have a duty of loyalty to his employer.
By creating
exceptions not contained within the statute’s language, an employee cannot know
what sort of off-duty conduct is protected.
Furthermore, the statute does not clearly define “lawful activity” which
128
further complicates the question of what types of conduct is protected.
In
Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, Hougum was arrested for masturbating in a
public bathroom’s stall; his employer, Valley Memorial Homes, terminated
129
Hougum as a result of the arrest.
Hougum sued Valley Memorial Homes for
130
violating § 14-02.4-03.
Hougum argued that he engaged in lawful activity
131
because the public restroom stall was a temporarily private space.
Due to
132
previous precedents, the court refused to determine whether Hougum’s off-duty
122

Id. at 168.
See supra notes 114–22.
124
See New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (App. Div. 1995); Pasch, No.
94 Civ. 8554, 1995 WL 469710, at *4–5.
125
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Spec. Sess.).
126
§ 14-02.4-08 (Westlaw) (emphasis added). The “occupational qualification” must relate to a
particular employee, and not to “all employees of that employer.” Id. This section of the statute is a
limitation to the at-will employment doctrine. Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th
Cir. 1995).
127
See Fatland, 62 F.3d at 1072–73 (holding that employee’s termination because of his ownership
in a competing business was not discrimination for lawful off-duty conduct in violation of § 14-02.0403 or -8, and that said ownership was a “legitimate source of concern” for the employer).
128
§ 14-02.4-03.
129
574 N.W.2d 812, 815 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 820. Masturbating in a public place is illegal under § 12.1–20–12.1 of the North Dakota
Code. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1–20–12.1 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Spec. Sess.).
132
The court noted that the enclosed stall of a public restroom was generally not considered a
“public” place. Hougum, 574 N.W.2d at 821 (citations omitted). This created a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Hougum’s conduct was forbidden by law. Id at 822. If Hougum’s activity
123
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133

conduct was lawful or unlawful activity.
The court noted that Valley Memorial
134
Homes’s potential conflicts claim
was very different from the employer
135
conflicts in Fatland.
In refusing to decide what was lawful within the statute,
the court further complicated the matter for employees. By noting the difference
136
between the employer’s interests in Fatland and Hougum, the court muddled the
issue for employers: Is a non-economic interest, like business efficiency, still a
viable business interest? Without clarification from either the courts or legislatures
on the statute’s boundaries, both sides of the issue—employees and employers
alike—do not derive any benefit from the statute because the boundaries of
protection are still undefined.
However, such ambiguity may be to the advantage of emerging issues, like
termination for lawful off-duty conduct as depicted on SNS. Under Fatland, if an
employee’s SNS postings do not involve her employer, it can be speculated that
such conduct is protected because it does not explicitly implicate an employer’s
137
business.
Thus, if applying North Dakota’s statute to Caitlin Davis’s situation, the
Patriots cannot elucidate a legitimate business-related interest or explain how the
content depicted in Caitlin Davis’s photographs reasonably related to a
cheerleader’s occupational qualifications, her act of posting photographs would be
protected activity. Furthermore, this analysis holds even if SNS content is deemed
“public” because the statute’s language only concerns activity that is “off the
138
employer’s premises during nonworking hours.”
Thus, an employee’s SNS
postings and its content are protected, regardless of the privacy settings. Such a
wide grant of protection is ideal for an emerging issue because it is flexible to a
changing society.
D. Privacy
At common law, the Constitution protects a person from governmental
invasion, but individual states confer a cause of action upon its citizens for such
139
invasions.
An intrusion upon seclusion claim is the type of claim an employee
140
would use to support an employee’s invasion of privacy claim.
To sustain a
cause of action for the intrusion upon seclusion, the Restatement requires an

was lawful, it could have been protected under the statute, and thus, any subsequent termination would
have violated the statute. Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. (“[The employer] . . . has raised a claim Hougum’s activity undermined his effectiveness as
a chaplain and therefore directly conflicted with its business-related interests.”).
135
Id. (“The potential conflicts raised by [the employer] are not the same type of business and
economic conflicts of interest at stake in Fatland.”) (citations omitted).
136
Compare Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 1995), with Hougum,
574 N.W.2d at 822.
137
See id.
138
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Spec. Sess.).
139
62 AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 2 (2011) (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530
(1922)). The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes four types of privacy invasions—the intrusion
upon seclusion; appropriation of name or likeness; publicity of private life; and false light.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 62(A)(2)(a)–(d) (1977).
140
Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights, supra note 25, at 5–6.
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intrusion into the personal affairs or concerns of another that is highly offensive to
141
Generally, a claimant must plead and prove four elements
a reasonable person.
142
in order to sustain a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion.
First, an
individual must make an unauthorized intrusion or pry into one’s seclusion;
second, the intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person; third, the
143
matter must be private; and finally, the intrusion must cause emotional distress.
Presently, courts do not recognize the act of viewing a website, even a SNS
144
personal profile, to be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Even if the common law privacy claim was a viable cause of action, not all
145
Therefore, this claim is not
states recognize the common law right of privacy.
available to many citizens. Unless states without a common law privacy claim
recognized a right of privacy in their case law or statutes, an employee cannot
assert this claim against her employer. Such a reality leaves an employee without
a way to fight against an employer making arbitrary employment decisions based
upon off-duty SNS posts.
III. CASES
Generally, state courts have recognized public policy exceptions to at-will
146
employment, but state courts are hesitant to extend public policy exceptions to
147
general off-duty behavior.
Presently, no courts have litigated whether an
employer’s adverse employment decision based upon an employee’s off-duty SNS
postings violated the employee’s rights. State courts have confronted whether
content from an individual’s SNS profile is discoverable for evidentiary
148
purposes.
Thus, this Comment will apply existing case law to the Caitlin Davis
hypothetical to analyze the failure of the present case holdings to resolve these
issues.
A. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group
149

In Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, the co-plaintiff, Brian Pietrylo
150
(“Pietrylo”) created a group on Myspace.com called “The Spec-Tator.”
The
141
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1977) (“One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.”).
142
Intrusion Upon Seclusion, Overview, IT LAW WIKI, http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Intrusion_upon_
seclusion#cite_note-0 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (citing Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013–14
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
143
Id.
144
Lipps, supra note 32, at 651.
145
For example, New York does not recognize a common law right to privacy. Rutkowski &
Rutkowski, Social Media Policies, supra note 29, at 4.
146
See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
147
Lipps, supra note 32, at 650.
148
See infra discussion Parts III.B–C.
149
A fellow employee, Doreen Marino (“Marino”), was also a party to this action. Pietrylo v.
Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06–5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008) [hereinafter
Pietrylo I].
150
Id.
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group’s purpose was to give the past and present employees of Houston’s
Restaurant an “entirely private” space to vent, “without any outside eyes spying
151
152
in.”
Membership was by invitation only.
Once a member was invited and he
accepted, the member accessed The Spec-Tator to read postings or to add new
153
postings.
No managers were invited to join The Spec-Tator, and none were
154
given a password.
Members discussed various topics on The Spec-Tator, such
as jokes about Houston’s customer service requirements, “sexual remarks about
155
management and customers,” and “references to violence and illegal drug use.”
A greeter at Houston’s, who was also a member of The Spec-Tator, showed
156
The manager was offended by the comments and
the postings to a manager.
157
shared them with other members of the management team.
Restaurant managers
asked the greeter for her username and password so they could view The Spec158
Tator’s postings, “which they did five times before firing” the plaintiffs.
As a
result of their termination, Pietrylo and Marino sued Houston’s under seven causes
159
of action, one being the common law invasion of privacy.
At his deposition, Pietrylo stated all of the postings were jokes, but members
160
In particular,
of the management team testified to the posts’ offensiveness.
regional supervisor Robert Marano testified that he was concerned about how the
161
postings would affect Houston’s operations.
The court found that a genuine
issue of material fact existed regarding whether Pietrylo and Marino had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in The Spec-Tator, and for that reason, the jury
162
decided the issue.
163
The
Ultimately, the jury rejected the plaintiffs’ privacy invasion claim.
jury sheet revealed that the jury recognized The Spec-Tator as a “place of solitude
and seclusion” designed to “protect the [p]latiniffs’ private affairs and
164
concerns.”
However, because of The Spec-Tator’s secluded status, the jury did
165
not find that the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that space.
151

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 2:06–cv–05754–FSH–PS, 2009 WL 2342553 (D.N.J. June
26, 2009) [hereinafter Pietrylo III].
155
Pietrylo I, 2008 WL 6085437, at *3–4.
156
Id. at *2.
157
Id. at *3–4.
158
Pietrylo III, 2009 WL 2342553, at *2.
159
Pietrylo I, 2008 WL 6085437, at *4–5. The other causes of action were for violations of the
federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006); the parallel New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3, -4(d) (West 2008); the federal Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2006); New Jersey’s parallel provision, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:156A–27 (West 2008); and wrongful termination in violation of public policy—first, for violating
public policy favoring freedom of speech, and for violating public policy against privacy invasions. Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. Specifically, Marano was worried that the posts contradicted Houston’s “four core values”
of “professionalism, positive mental attitude, aim to please approach, and teamwork.” Id.
162
Id. at *7.
163
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06CV05754, 2009 WL 1867659 (D.N.J. June 16, 2009)
[hereinafter Pietrylo II].
164
Id.
165
Id.
152
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166

Although the jury did not find for the plaintiffs
Thus, their privacy claim failed.
on their privacy claim, the case still establishes that employers can be found liable
for using information from SNS to discipline or terminate their employees,
especially if the employer obtained that information without the employees’
167
consent.
B. EEOC v. Simply Storage Management, L.L.C.
In EEOC v. Simply Storage Management, L.L.C., the court held that the
EEOC must produce a claimant’s relevant SNS communications per a defendant’s
168
discovery request.
Two claimants alleged that the defendant, Simply Storage,
169
was liable for sexual harassment.
The relevant issue was whether the claimants’
SNS profiles and other communications were within the scope of discovery for the
170
defendants.
The defendants sought “all status updates, messages, wall
comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details,
blurbs, comments, and applications,” photos and videos posted within a certain
171
time frame.
Significantly, the court interpreted “SNS profile” to mean
absolutely any and all content that an SNS user posted to her profile.
The EEOC objected to producing all SNS profile content, partly because it
would “improperly infringe on claimants’ privacy”; the EEOC also argued that
SNS content production should be restricted to content that “directly address[ed] or
172
comment[ed] on matters alleged in the complaint.”
To the court, the “main
challenge” was defining “appropriately broad limits” on SNS content’s
discoverability in a way consistent with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
173
26(b).
The court developed a “test” that the claimants had to provide copies of
all SNS content that “reveal[ed], refer[red], or relate[d] to any emotion, feeling, or
mental state, as well as communications that reveal[ed], refer[red], or relate[d] to
events that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling,
174
or mental state.”
Thus, the court interpreted SNS content to be anything
175
relevant to a case’s issues.

166
Pietrylo III, 2009 WL 2342553, at *2. However, the jury found the defendant to have violated
the federal Stored Communication Act and New Jersey’s parallel provision; and the jury awarded
Pietrylo and Marino over $13,000 in back pay, compensatory, and punitive damages. Galit Kiercut,
Recent Developments in Employment Law and the Impact of Technology on Workplace Trends,
ASPATORE, 2011 WL 4452119 *1, *2 (Aug. 2011).
167
Id.
168
EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., L.L.C., 270 F.R.D. 430, 437 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
169
Id. at 432.
170
Id.
171
Id. The timeframe in question here was from April 23, 2007 until the hearing. Id.
172
Id. at 432, 434.
173
Id. at 433–34.
174
Id. at 436. The court reasoned that the EEOC’s request that claimants produce only
communications that directly referenced their sexual harassment claims was too restrictive. Id. at 435.
However, to require the claimants to provide all SNS content ignored the reality that just because a
claimant was active on her SNS profile did not mean the activity was relevant to a claim or defense at
issue in the litigation. Id.
175
Id.
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C. Romano v. Steelcase, Inc.
In Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., Romano claimed that the defendant, Steelcase,
Inc., caused her to suffer injuries that negatively affected her “enjoyment of
176
life.”
SNS content was at issue because Steelcase, Inc. argued that reviewing
public portions of the plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace pages showed she had “an
active lifestyle” in the time period she claimed her injuries prevented such
177
pursuits.
As a result of how Romano’s SNS photographs belied her claim,
Steelcase, Inc. requested “full access to and copies of [the] [p]laintiff’s current and
178
historical records/information on her Facebook and MySpace accounts.”
Romano refused on the grounds that providing such content violated her rights to
179
privacy.
Although this Comment will not explore the evidentiary implications
of holding SNS profiles discoverable, the court’s rationale reveals how courts view
an individual’s privacy expectations in her SNS profile.
180
First, the
The Romano court relied on decisions from other jurisdictions.
Romano court applied the Second Circuit’s dicta in United States v. Lifshiz—which
181
analogized emails to letters—to the issue of SNS privacy.
By analogizing
emails to letters, the Lifshiz court held that a person did not have a reasonable
182
expectation of privacy in her emails.
The Romano court concluded the same
183
rationale extended to SNS profile content.
Unfortunately, the Romano court
ignored the Lifshiz court’s fairly limited analogy—the only significant difference
between emails and letters is the delivery method. Thus, while it was reasonable
for the Lifshiz court to hold that there is no privacy expectation in emails, it was
not reasonable for the Romano court to apply the Lifshiz’s holding to SNS profile
privacy. The content, audience, and general nature of SNS profiles are radically
different from that of emails; the Romano court applied a somewhat antiquated
standard to a completely new type of technology. The Romano court ignored the
issues and concerns that arise with a new technology type.
More disturbing was the Romano court’s adoption, by way of reference, of
other jurisdictions’ rationales for denying that a user has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in her SNS posts. According to Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield
of New Jersey, an individual’s privacy concerns are de minimis when the
184
individual posted the content to their profile.
By this rationale, an individual
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of her postings, regardless

176

30 Misc. 3d 426, 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
Id. Romano traveled within the time period alleged. Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 432.
The case dictates that the relevancy of certain evidence cannot be withheld by “hid[ing] behind selfset privacy controls on a website” if that evidence is both material and relevant, and the plaintiff is
claiming substantial damages for the loss of enjoyment of life. Id. at 431.
180
Id. at 433.
181
Id. (citing United States v. Lifshiz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004)).
182
Id. (“[E]mails would be analogous to a letter–writer whose expectation of privacy ordinarily
terminates upon delivery of the letter.”).
183
Id.
184
Id. (citing Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., No. 06–5537, 2007 WL 7393489
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007)).
177
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of her profile’s privacy settings. The court in Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc.
held that an individual has no “reasonable expectation of privacy where that person
took [the] affirmative act of posting [to her] own [SNS profile], making it available
185
to anyone with a computer and opening it up to the public eye.”
In contemplating its holding, the Romano court went a step further by
holding that:
[W]hen [Romano] created her [SNS] accounts, she consented to the fact that her
personal information would be shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy
settings . . . . Since [Romano] knew that her information may become publicly
available, she cannot now claim that she had a reasonable expectation of
186
privacy.

Here, by holding that an SNS user cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, regardless of her privacy settings, the court erases the possibility of
addressing the question in the near future. The implications of the Romano court’s
holding are explored further in Part IV.A.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Potential Consequences of the Above Holdings
The three cases above, when examined in their totality, paint a disturbing
portrait of how courts perceive emerging technology and privacy. Significantly,
the courts have shown they are not willing to recognize that an individual has an
expectation of privacy in an SNS profile. These holdings represent a major boon
to employers because if an employee’s profile is not private, then it logically
follows that an employer is free to use an SNS profile’s content in her employment
decisions, regardless of what the content represents.
SNS profile participants run the gamut of all types of people. To hold all
187
profiles as being inherently public
is an overextension of the public’s
expectations. Furthermore, it cannot be said that an employee who takes the
188
affirmative act to set her SNS profile access to “private”
does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy; if that were not true, then why would there be
privacy settings? If an individual did not believe her SNS profile was private, then
189
why would she take the steps to protect it?
And why would an SNS developer
continue offering privacy settings if no one can be said to respect them?
Additionally, it seems unjust that SNS participants are to have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an SNS profile’s content on the mere possibility it may
185

Id. (citing Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Ct. App. 2009)).
Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
187
See id. at 434.
188
See discussion supra Part I about SNS privacy settings.
189
The Romano court attempted to buttress the argument that an SNS user cannot claim a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her SNS profile’s content by pointing to the fact no SNS website
offers a guarantee of complete privacy. Romano, 30 Misc. 3d at 434. However, the Romano court still
includes Facebook’s language that privacy settings are offered to allow a user to limit access to her SNS
profile. Id. Even if there is not complete privacy, SNS developers still offer users the option to restrict
access to their profile. See discussion supra Part I. This strongly suggests that SNS developers
recognize, on some level, that users view their SNS profile’s content as private.
186
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190

become public.
A court should not be allowed to erase a privacy expectation
because of something as tenuous as the qualifier “may.”
Courts focus on certain aspects of SNS—that they are meant to share—
191
ignoring privacy settings.
Instead, courts seem content to paint all SNS activity
with the same brush. Just because a person has an SNS profile to connect with her
friend and family does not mean her SNS profile, and all its content, should be
deemed public in the eyes of the law. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to accept, as
the Romano court contends, that SNS profiles are, by their very nature, public, or
192
193
“else they would cease to exist.”
People use SNS to connect with people, not
to advertise their lives to anyone with an Internet connection. The mere existence
of privacy settings suggests that there is a privacy expectation within SNS postings
194
as recognized by the SNS developers themselves.
A person should not be
195
forced to surrender her SNS profile’s content to the entire Internet-using public
196
just to participate in the self-expression of SNS.
If these holdings are carried to
their furthest conclusion, the results are far too broad and overreaching.
Courts are supposed to evolve and adapt to society, and presently, the
public’s participation in SNS is too entrenched in modern life for the courts to
ignore the issues of privacy.
B. New Definition of “Legitimate Business Interest” in the Context of SNS
Posts
An employer can claim a legitimate business interest in parts of her business
197
where she has invested money.
Thus, an employer has a legitimate business
interest to protect not only traditional business information, such as client lists, but
198
also more intangibles, like its reputation.
However, the term legitimate business
interests is ambiguous and amorphous; even the meaning of a fairly static term like
“reputation” can be a product of interpretation and context. As a result, an
employer can too easily claim any employment decision is founded upon a
legitimate business interest.
In an effort to tether a flighty phrase like legitimate business interest to the
ground, some jurisdictions have defined a legitimate business interests. It is
beneficial to examine these definitions for what they reveal as being what the
legislatures and courts pinpoint as being the essence of legitimate business
interests. From these statutes, this Comment will propose a new definition of
legitimate business interest to evaluate whether an employer’s business interest is
implicated by an employee’s SNS content.
Florida’s definition of legitimate business interest developed within the

190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

See Romano, 30 Misc. 3d at 434.
See id.
Id.
See FACEBOOK, supra note 13.
See supra notes 15–16.
See Romano, 30 Misc. 3d at 434.
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
See Roche, supra note 22, at 189.
Id. at 190.
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199

However, the relevant
context of evaluating the legality of restrictive covenants.
statute, Florida Statute § 542.335, has a non-exhaustive list of legitimate business
200
201
interests.
Legitimate business interest includes trade secrets;
valuable
confidential business information; “substantial relationships with specific
prospective or existing customers, patients, or clients”; client goodwill associated
202
203
204
with a business’s “trade name,
trademark,
service mark,
or ‘trade
205
206
dress’”; and specialized training.
The restrictive and limited language of the above-mentioned statutes and
case law does not offer an employer protection for interests that may fall outside of
the above parameters. Nor would such a restrictive definition benefit an employee.
In the face of such limited language, it is reasonably foreseeable that an employer
would implement an SNS policy to outright forbid an employee’s use of SNS; an
employer could adopt this self-help to protect his business interests in a way that
207
the legislature or courts do not.
Should an employee disobey such a policy in an
effort to maintain relationships through SNS, she would be subject to the same sort
of adverse employment decisions this Comment seeks to resolve. However, the
statute pinpoints the most crucial component of legitimate business interests—
customers and clients. The importance of customers is reinforced by Illinois’s
seven-factor test for determining a legitimate business interest.
In Illinois, courts look at seven factors to determine if an employer has a
208
legitimate business interest.
The seven factors are:
(1) the length of time required to develop clientele; (2) the amount of money
invested to acquire clients; (3) the degree of difficulty in acquiring clients; (4) the
extent of personal customer contact by the employee; (5) the extent of the
employer’s knowledge of its clients; (6) the duration of the customer’s association
with the employer; and (7) the continuity of the employer–customer
209
relationships.

199
See Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2009).
Florida statute section 542.335 is a “framework for analyzing, evaluating and enforcing restrictive
covenants contained in employment contracts.” Id. (quoting Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258,
1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).
200
FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.). A restrictive
covenant not supported by one or more legitimate business interests is void and unenforceable as a
matter of law. Id.
201
A trade secret is defined as being “[a] formula, process, device, or other business information
that is kept confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors” that has independent economic
value and is kept secret through reasonable efforts. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (3d ed. 2006).
202
A trade name is “[a] name, style, or symbol used to distinguish a company, partnership, or
business (as opposed to a product or service); the name under which a business operates.” Id.
203
Generally, a trademark is “[a] word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a
manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others.” Id.
204
A servicemark is “[a] name, phrase, or other device used to identify and distinguish the services
of a certain provider.” Id. at 649.
205
Trade dress is a business’s total image. See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
206
FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.).
207
See supra text accompanying note 58.
208
See Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 402 (Ill. 2011).
209
Hanchett Paper Co., v. Melchiorre, 792 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); aff’d, Reliable Fire
Equip. Co., at 402.
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Factors are assessed within the “totality of the facts and circumstances” of
210
each case, with no single factor dispositive.
Instead, factors are “nonconclusive
211
aids.”
Presently, “legitimate business interest(s)” are prime for an employer’s
manipulation to terminate an employee for her off-duty conduct, regardless of
whether it negatively affected an employer’s business interests. Since an employer
should only be able to terminate an employee for off-duty SNS posts that implicate
an employer’s legitimate business interest, this Comment proposes a new standard
to determine if an employee’s SNS post damaged, or could damage, her
212
employer’s legitimate business interests.
If an employer cannot establish that
the employee’s SNS content damages an employer’s legitimate business interest,
then the employer’s adverse employment decision is illegal.
Thus, bearing the above in mind, this Comment proposes the following: to
have an actionable legitimate business interest(s) to discipline or terminate an
employee for the content of her off-duty, non-work related SNS post, an employer
must show that the SNS post has damaged, or will substantially damage, the
employer’s relationship with specific prospective or existing customers, patients,
213
or clients.
Factors a court may consider to evaluate this relationship include, but
is not limited to: the length of time undertaken to develop clientele; the amount of
money invested to develop client(s); employer’s knowledge of its clientele; and the
214
duration of the customer’s relationship with the employer.
An employer cannot
require that an employee give the employer access to her SNS profile as a
215
condition of employment.
If an employee’s off-duty, non-work related conduct
210

Reliable Fire Equip. Co., at 403.
Id. The seven–factor test is used with a “three-prong rule of reason” to “determine the
enforceability of a restrictive covenant not to compete.” Id. The three-prong rule of reason is
“reasonable only if the covenant: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of a legitimate
business interest of the employer-promisee; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employeepromisor, and (3) is not injurious to the public.” Id. at 396 (citing BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712
N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999)).
212
In general, courts assess legitimate business interests within the context of determining the
enforceability of non–compete covenants in employment contracts. See generally R.P. Davis, Validity
and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Contracts of Employment, 98 A.L.R. 963 (1935); LOUIS
ALTMAN & MARIA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES §
16:32 (4th ed. 2011), available at 2 Callmann on Unfair Comp., Tr. & Mono. § 16:32 (Westlaw).
213
See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (1996).
214
See Hanchett Paper Co., 792 N.E.2d at 401.
215
A recent trend has developed of employers requesting potential employees to give the employer
their SNS passwords. Because employees have availed themselves to Facebook’s privacy settings, it
has become “more difficult for outsiders to look in.” Rebecca Greenfield, It’s Getting Harder for Your
Employer to Use Facebook Against You, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (Sep. 7, 2011),
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/09/its-getting-harder-your-employer-use-facebookagainst-you/42170. As a result, employers are desperate to find “other ways to reclaim the insights”
that SNS profiles provide, and thus, have started requiring that potential employees give their SNS’s
passwords as part of the interview process. Megan Garber, Would You Give Job Interviewers Your
Facebook Password? Because They Might Ask, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2012, 10:18 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/would-you-give-job-interviewers-yourfacebook-password-because-they-might-ask/254810. However, employees have spoken out against this
practice. In the public sector, the Maryland Department of Corrections was forced to discontinue this
practice when the American Civil Liberties Union got involved. Greenfield, supra. In New York, a
statistician “ended a job interview after he was asked to provide his Facebook password during its
proceedings.” Garber, supra.
There is concern that such a practice will become commonplace. On May 2, 2012, Maryland
211
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is illegal, the employer cannot discipline or terminate the employee without
showing damage to her business interests. This definition of legitimate business
interest and its factors are applicable within the specific context of adverse
employment decisions made on the basis of an employee’s SNS profile’s content.
The above defines legitimate business interests in terms of the essence of
business—relationships with a party willing to pay for the business’s services. It
goes without saying that a business, from doctors to restaurants to contractors,
cannot succeed without a paying clientele. By equating legitimate business interest
with customer/client relationships, much of the ambiguity surrounding terms like
“reputation interest” is removed. The confusion is removed because the employer
is forced to pinpoint how an employee’s SNS content will damage the employer’s
business in a concrete way, as opposed to supposition.
Another benefit of the above definition is that it puts the burden on the
employer to prove how the employee’s SNS posts will harm the employer’s
business by damaging client relationships. This makes sense because the employer
is in a better position to provide such information.
This is beneficial because it places the burden on the employer to both
explain and show the negative impact of their employee’s SNS posts. By requiring
the employer to demonstrate how said posts impact their relationships with
customers, the employer is forced to elucidate a sound basis for his adverse
employment decisions. Instead of a knee-jerk reaction to an employee’s lifestyle
choices, an employer must look to his customer’s opinion, and not rely on his own
216
opinions.
In so doing, an employer cannot make an adverse employment
decision because an employer dislikes an employee’s lifestyle choice. It forbids an
employer from relying on the supposition that an employee’s off-duty, non-work
related SNS postings will have a negative impact on the employer’s business
relationship because the employer must point to specific, verifiable sets of
customers. The employer is in a better position to evaluate such relationships.
Furthermore, this definition is good for employers because it recognizes her right
became the first state to pass a law prohibiting employers from demanding Facebook passwords from
either their present or prospective employees. Labor and Employment—User Name Privacy Protection
and Exclusions, ch. 233 (codified as MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3–712 (Oct. 1, 2012); Saul
Ewing LLP, Governor O’Malley Signs Maryland Law Prohibiting Employers from Seeking Access to
Personal Social Media Information; Other States Considering Similar Bans, JD SUPRA (May 2, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/governor-omalley-signs-maryland-law-pro-75409. State legislatures
in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington are considering similar
bans. Saul Ewing LLP, supra. Such a practice by employers may soon violate federal law. On April
27, 2012, Representative Eliot Engel of New York and Representative Jan Schakowsky of Illinois
introduced the Social Networking Online Protection Act, which will subject violators to a $10,000.00
fine. Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 5050, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
Given how quickly both state and federal legislatures have responded to this practice, asking for an
SNS password violates an individual’s privacy; it follows that using any information obtained from an
SNS profile in such a way also violates a person’s privacy. It is unclear as to whether employers will be
prohibited from demanding SNS passwords from both employees and prospective employees in all
state’s legislation. However, given that both Maryland’s law and the proposed House bill prevent
employers from making SNS passwords a condition of employment for either employees or prospective
employees, it logically follows that such is the standard in the other states’ legislation. Furthermore, it
does not address the main topic of this article—whether employers can use information from SNS
profiles, without the password, in employment decisions.
216
This Comment does not focus on what level of an employer’s knowledge is sufficient to show
that his business relationship with customers or potential customers will be damaged by the employee’s
off-duty, non-work related posts.
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to protect her legitimate business interests.
The factors benefit the employer as well. They help refine the definition’s
specificity requirement. Factors give an employer a guideline of what an employer
can point to when evaluating how an employee’s SNS post damages her legitimate
business interest. Furthermore, by not requiring that the employer use the above
factors, it recognizes that the employer has a legitimate business relationship in
things like new clients or customers; it recognizes that there is a need to protect
business relationships that have not yet fully developed, but should be protected.
Because the employer carries a burden to show cause for an adverse employment
decision, it is not necessary to require them to pass a factor test. Instead, an
employer may point to certain factors if the factors assist to clarify her position.
This definition is also best for an employee because it forces the employer to
articulate exactly how the employee’s SNS postings damage the employer’s
business through a loss or harmed business relationship. Thus, it is much more
difficult—if not impossible—for an employer to base employment decisions on his
distaste for an employee’s lifestyle choices, or, on the supposition that an
employee’s lifestyle choices could negatively impact the employer’s business. An
employer will not be able to react to an employee’s off-duty SNS post without
proof of the postings potential or actual damage to the business. This ultimately
protects an employee’s interests by protecting her right to participate in SNS.
Furthermore, this definition restores a degree of privacy to an employee’s
217
SNS posts.
An employer may see the employee’s SNS posts, but the employer
cannot base adverse employment decisions upon an employee’s SNS postings if
said postings do not affect the employer’s business relationships. Thus, an
employee can participate in SNS without fearing it will lead to employment
discipline or termination.
In applying the above to Caitlin Davis’s situation, the Patriots would have to
show exactly how her photographs damaged the Patriots’ relationship with their
customers. This could be ticketholders, vendors, or advertisers—businesses have
customer bases. However, for the Patriots, no matter how distasteful Caitlin
Davis’s photographs were, it would be difficult to find cause to terminate her. Are
an eighteen-year-old’s photographs really going to prevent the Patriots from selling
tickets? From obtaining advertisers? The above definition forces an employer to
make decisions that are realistic within the context of his business. An NFL team
is made up of far more than a cheerleader. If the above definition existed during
Caitlin Davis’s publicity troubles, most likely, she could not have been fired.
Most importantly, the above definition gives a zone of privacy around a
person’s decisions. No matter how immature or bizarre a decision may be, the
individual is entitled to make her own choices without the noose of employment
discipline or termination looming over her. And in that freedom, a person has the
privacy to make choices knowing her employer cannot harm her employment
situation without cause. Certainly, someone like a Caitlin Davis would have
“paid” for her distasteful photographs, but it would have been eternal
embarrassment or criticism. An employer’s influence should not extend into an
employee’s life once she is off-duty and free to structure her own time. An
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employee should be free to make legal, off-duty choices—even bad choices—and
post about said choices on her SNS profile. If someone makes a bad decision—
like posing for photos of an individual with swastikas drawn all over him—that
individual will get enough flak from her SNS profile followers to learn a lesson.
The cost need not be in the form of losing her job.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not ideal that a large portion of an individual’s life is lived in the semipublic sphere of SNS profiles; however, it is reality. SNS are not a fleeting trend.
Courts should construct laws that recognize the realities of life as it is presently
lived, which is why courts should protect a person’s expectation of privacy in her
SNS posts by requiring that an employer show how his legitimate business
interests are damaged before making an adverse employment decision. Otherwise,
it is foreseeable that there will be an increase in litigation that forces courts to
change their position on SNS profiles, or legislatures will do it for the courts
instead.

